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Abstract
The objective of this study is to examine the vi-
sion Augustine developed on the relationship be-
tween religion and politics, and how he conceived 
the Christian religion as the foundation of polit-
ical and social action. Firstly, he emphasizes in 
his reflections on officials in the res publica that 
their work was marked by tragedy. State institu-
tions and political relationships are characterized 
by the volatility and temporality. The only ones 
that do not seem to realize this are the politicians 
themselves, because the nature of their work does 
not contribute to the development of the ability 
to (self-) introspection and growth in humilitas 
(humility). Secondly, in his De Civitate Dei Augus-
tine strove to present human history as a mirror in 
which each leader can see the impact of his own 
inner motives. The struggle between Jerusalem 
and Babylon, greed and generosity, sincerity and 
opportunism is a battle in the interior for Augus-
tine. But in Book XIX of De civitate Dei Augustine 
finally also relates physical balance, irrational and 
rational motives, striving for integrity, the role 
of family and government, in order to show that 
inner peace and peace in any social context are 
interwoven.
Keywords: Augustine, leadership, mystagogy, pa-
tristics, politics, rationality, religion. 
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Resumen
El objetivo de este estudio fue examinar la visión 
que desarrolló san Agustín sobre la relación entre 
religión y política, y la manera en que concebía la 
religión cristiana como la base de la acción po-
lítica y social. En primer lugar, él enfatiza en sus 
reflexiones sobre los funcionarios de la res  publica 
cuyo trabajo fue marcado por la tragedia. Las ins-
tituciones estatales y las relaciones políticas se 
caracterizan por la volatilidad y la temporalidad. 
Los únicos que no parecen darse cuenta de esto 
son los políticos porque la naturaleza de su traba-
jo no contribuye al desarrollo de la capacidad de 
(auto) introspección y el crecimiento en humilitas 
(humildad). En segundo lugar, en De Ciuitate Dei 
Agustín se esforzó por presentar la historia hu-
mana como un espejo en el que cada líder puede 
ver el impacto en sus propios motivos internos. La 
lucha entre Jerusalén y Babilonia, codicia y gene-
rosidad, sinceridad y oportunismo, es una batalla 
interior para san Agustín. Sin embargo, en el Libro 
XIX de De civitate Dei Agustín, finalmente, rela-
ciona el equilibrio físico, los motivos irracionales 
y racionales, la lucha por la integridad, el papel de 
la familia y el gobierno para mostrar que la paz in-
terior y la paz en cualquier contexto social están 
interrelacionadas.
Palabras clave: Religión, política, racionalidad, 
mistagógica, patrística, san Agustín, liderazgo.
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Incomparable Times
In the fourth and fifth century, the influence of the Christian  bishops in the 
Roman Empire suddenly increased in a  tremendous way. The fact that many 
of them were well educated began to pay off. The bishops had developed the 
capacity to integrate the  rhetorical strategies and practices of the Greco- 
Roman orators into their own discourse. Moreover, they knew how to embed 
principles from classical philosophy into their interpretation of the Christian 
message. In doing so they reflected the culture of the upper class, to which 
many of them belonged personally.1 Bishops such as the aristocrat Paulinus of 
Nola and his pen friend Augustine, for instance, were deeply versed in clas-
sical rhetoric, literature, and philosophy. They became important figures in 
Roman society because Christianity became the dominant religion, but also 
because of their own contribution to this process. In addition, the allure that 
the ascetical life held for the aristocracy also consolidated the power of the 
bishops, as bishops such as Ambrose strongly propagated it (Natal  Villazala 
59-107). Research of episcopal dealings in the public domain has revealed, 
moreover, that other activities of theirs also contributed to the increase of 
their power and influence. In addition to their catechetical, homiletical, and 
liturgical activities, in both East and West, they developed programmes for 
the care of the poor,2 they also founded hospitals (Crislip, passim), and—rec-
ognised by the State as judges—bishops followed Roman procedures in issues 
related to property law, inheritances, or contracts, by interrogating—rather 
than inculpating—people in respect of the legal basis of slavery, the right of 
asylum, or adultery. Augustine once wrote to the tribune Marcellinus that this 
interrogation should be sharp and painful, so that the accused party would be 
all the more grateful for the evangelical clemency (mansuetudo) that should 
characterise the sentence (ep., 133, 2). The Church father’s intention in writing 
this will be explored below. What is clear in any case is that  strategies such as 
these increased the bishops’ power, although it must also be noted that Chris-
tian relations with the other religious or  philosophical traditions in the plural 
society of the time were sometimes unclear, and that there was a certain un-
ease between Christianity and Roman culture. But this does not mean that 
religion in Late Antiquity was a private affair. In the plural society of the time, 
1 This publication is based on van Geest and Hunink; van Geest “Waarachtigheid”; “Geor-
dend is de politie”; and “‘Quid dicam de vindicando.” See also the important studies of the 
growing unofficial power, a power as yet without legal sanction, by Brown; Cameron; and 
Rapp.
2 See Lepelley; and Holman.
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Christianity embodied a social practice which was connected with individuals’ 
own—at times ascetic—lifestyle. 
The situation of Christians in the fourth and fifth centuries cannot be easi-
ly compared with the current situation of Christians in my own secularised 
country, the Netherlands. Whereas in the former case, the Church increas-
ingly began to shape society; in the latter, bishops and other Church leaders 
are becoming ever more invisible in society. From the second half of the nine-
teenth century up to the 1960s, Dutch society was characterised by verzuiling 
(“pillarisation”). There was sharp segregation between the Protestant, Catho-
lic, liberal, and socialist sections of society, which was deliberately enforced 
by the elites at the top of these four “pillars.” It was sustained by the churches, 
media, vocational corporations, political parties, schools, hospitals, and even 
universities, and provided the members of the “pillars” with a strong sense of 
identity. In the Catholic pillar, political leaders were clerics such as Msgr W. 
Nolens and Msgr H. Schaepman. In the 1960s these pillars toppled over and 
came down with a crash. Prelates such as Herman Schaepman or Willem No-
lens had long since ceased to dominate politics or parliamentary debate. Few 
people can remember that a hospital such as St. Francis’s in Rotterdam was 
once founded and fully owned by the Augustinian Sisters of Heemstede—the 
doctors were employees of this congregation—and the existence of this hos-
pital certainly cannot be said to contribute to an increase in episcopal pow-
er and influence. Whereas self-confident bishops energetically fostered the 
growth of Christianity as a significant societal force in Late Antiquity (through 
networks, sermonising specifically geared to certain audiences, care for the 
sick, or the administration of justice), relations between Church and  secular 
leaders are currently characterised by a certain unease. Unless you are Des-
mond Tutu, Church dignitaries are relegated to the domain of  faith, i.e. the 
private domain that must be kept strictly separate from the  public domain. 
Despite the incomparability of the times, it is nonetheless useful to examine 
the views that a Church father like Augustine developed on the relationship 
between religion and politics, and on the Christian religion as the foundation 
of political and social action. Can his vision offer anything of value to peo-
ple who operate currently in the public domain? It will become evident that 
he offers no ready-made solutions for the problem of how Christianity  might 
provide a solid basis for the develop ment of Christian Democratic politics. 
Augustine never thought of this question because democracy as we know it 
was totally alien to him as a political system. What he does do in his political 
thought, however, is to intensify a sense of reality that is truly timeless. 
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The Tragedy of Politics and the State
When Augustine was young, around 390, he subscribed to the  notion, derived 
from Greek philosophy and Roman political ideology, that the polis or the civi-
tas offered free citizens a  trajectory towards individual perfection. With Plato 
and Aristotle, he  regarded “politics” as a creative process which generated a 
social order that enabled the free individual to obtain happiness through a 
step-by-step plan. Competent leaders, he believed, ordered society in such 
a way as to permit their subjects to attain the highest degree of happiness 
for themselves. This perfection was individual: disciplina was more important 
than concordia.3 
However, his reading of Scripture, which informed him of the vicissitudes of 
the Jewish people, caused Augustine to conclude after 390 that it was much 
more difficult to actually realise this life under the guidance of the philoso-
pher-politician, and on the basis of the right use of reason, than he had initially 
believed. As it turned out, people were much less reasonable than he  thought. 
Scripture taught him that the classical philosophers had been unable to re-
solve the tragic nature of the saeculum, where tension, discord, and chaos de-
termine life, and where neither society nor politics are capable of playing the 
grand role in the pursuit of happiness that they were supposed to. Having had 
a dose of realism through the pastoral work he began to do after becoming 
bishop of Hippo in 396, a town inhabited by fishermen and dockworkers, Au-
gustine started to emphasize that, even though people are social animals, their 
dealings with one another since the Fall have engendered chaos and aggres-
sion. Initially he still believed on account of humankind’s social character that 
the State should attempt to establish concordia, a condition which produces 
kindness, art, and civilisation in social interactions (qu. an., 33, 72; doc. chr., 2, 
39, 58). But having become more realistic after 397, he moderated his expec-
tations, because he realized that politicians were already hands full trying to 
curb violence of all kinds. He adjusted his ambitious expectations, writing that 
to attempt to counteract the forces that tended towards chaos, the opposite 
of order, was in fact politicians’ most important objective (doc. chr., 12, 27, 1). 
It was their task to prevent the people—to whom they belonged themselves, 
incidentally—from devouring each other like fish. That is all they can hope to 
achieve. They are not lords and masters of history, nor of the individual soul. In 
the best-case scenario, the leaders of the State create the conditions for that 
3 A groundbreaking work on this aspect is Markus’ Saeculum: History and Society in the Theo-
logy of St Augustine.
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peace that arises when society is in agreement with itself on the distribution 
and acquisition of the necessities of life (civ., 19, 6; 2, 21).4 Politicians can also 
bring about a certain measure of justice, the justice that flows from sacrificing 
one’s own pursuit of profit for the common good (Markus 72-104). 
But even so, later, when Augustine began writing his De civitate Dei (“The City 
of God”) (cited hereafter civ.) in 410, he became convinced that perfect jus-
tice—the perfect state where citizens and their leaders are of one heart—could 
never exist in any earthly State. Wars waged by people who cannot even un-
derstand each other’s language, and the dangers in society that increase as 
the masses grow in number, were further proof for him that peace can never 
be realised on any level.5 This ultimately led him to disavow Plato’s idea that 
politicians were the appropriate agents to lead people to individual perfec-
tion. But this does not mean that he thought politics meaningless. If politicians 
succeed in counteracting social chaos they have already achieved a great deal. 
In his reflections Augustine also took account of the fact that the activities 
of politicians are tragic. For a start, they must use language to realise their 
goals. And language also permits people to lie and to deceive, thus further 
distancing them from themselves and from others (Gen. adu. Man., 2, 7; 2, 30; 
conf., 1, 17, 27-18; 29; 3, 3, 6; 9, 2, 2; doc. chr., 6, 2).6 And secondly, no politi-
cal system endures (s., 105).7 Institutions of State and political structures are 
ephemeral and temporary. The only people who appear not to realise this tend 
to be politicians themselves, because the nature of their work is not conducive 
to developing the capacity of taking oneself lightly and to grow in humilitas 
(“humility”). Because of the impermanence of all empires or political systems, 
Augustine spoke increasingly of an Imperium christianum as he grew older 
(Lohse, 470-475). This brings us to the next topic.
The Uncoupling of Religion and Politics 
in Early Christianity 
In the second and third century, the period in which the Church was being 
persecuted by the Roman emperors, Christian writers had decidedly apoca-
lyptic ideas about the Roman Empire. Hippolytus, for instance, compared it 
to the last of the four beasts that the prophet Daniel had seen in a vision—the 
4 See Burt 127-129.
5 On this theme see civ. 10, 4-7.
6 This means Augustine believes there was no need for language in paradise. 
7 “Civitas manet quae nos carnaliter genuit.”
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most terrifying of the four, crushing everything before it (Dan. 7: 7-9). The em-
perors, he thought, increased their power by conquest and the empire was 
therefore a diabolical imitation of the Kingdom of Christ. But once Christianity 
had become a recognised religion, and bishops began to have power and in-
fluence themselves, the Christian perception of the Roman Empire changed. 
Eusebius of Caesarea, the first Church historian, believed that the unity of the 
Orbis Romanus under the Roman emperors had been God’s will. That Jesus had 
been born under the unifying reign of the Emperor Augustus was no coinci-
dence. This unity had facilitated the proclamation of the Gospel. Ambrose, Au-
gustine’s mentor, regarded the Roman emperor as a filius ecclesiae, the son of 
the Church par excellence, because he was able to Christianise the world using 
the institutions of the empire. Thus, Roman power became strongly sacralized. 
Around 400, Augustine agreed with his mentor that Christianisation could 
take place in an institutional way under the aegis of the emperor. But as his in-
teraction and correspondence with political leaders intensified, his view of the 
role of political leaders, and of humans in general, changed. Unlike Ambrose, 
his references to the Pax Romana as part of sacred history became scarce (civ., 
18, 46). He no longer regarded the Roman Empire as a praeparatio evangelica, 
and when he mentioned the Emperor Augustus, he emphasized the conflicts 
that marked his reign. He then explicitly linked the conflicts in the world to the 
restlessness of the human heart. This, he believed, prevented humanity from 
converting to Christianity collectively and along the institutional way. What is 
more: the actions of emperors and politicians were just as much the result of 
this restlessness, and in fact of an often fruitless ambition. On the basis of this 
observation Augustine emphasized that political leaders could not legitimise 
their claims on the obedience of the citizens by pointing to their belonging to 
a higher, divine order.8 In this way, Augustine desacralized the history of Rome, 
and, having become more realistic about the intentions of those who serve the 
public cause, he uncoupled religion and politics (civ., 2, 19). 
The reason for this uncoupling was his gradual discovery that political leaders, 
particularly through their pride, their love of power, and their ambition, are apt 
to make choices that do not benefit their people. They should not therefore be 
invested with sacral power. As a young Christian, he had stressed that perfect 
leaders ideally should be well-educated and thus possess wisdom. Ideally, they 
would be impervious to the allure of temporary success and the temptation 
to place themselves in the spotlight. Leaders of this disposition would be able 
8 Other aspects of Augustine’s view of imperial policy are discussed in van Geest and  Hunink. 
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to lead the people, along the  paths of the legally guaranteed order in society, 
to  understanding of the universe and of the cosmic order, and to happiness, 
which are both accessible to reason (ord., 2, 8, 25).9 The social  order is good 
only if it reflects the cosmic order, and treats each creature justly by assigning 
to it the place in the ordo that belongs to it.10 A human being must, for instance, 
never be used as an animal or an instrument; nor must he see himself as God 
(mus., 6, 16, 46; 6, 17, 58; 6, 17, 56; vera rel., 12, 23; 20, 38).11 A leader is good if, 
being wise and just himself, he gives his tormented subjects access to the uni-
verse and to happiness through reason (Cranz). Although Augustine continued 
to perfect his thinking on the natural and social order, he began to qualify 
this Platonic notion of political leadership  after 400. Just as perfect  justice will 
never be realised in society, no politician can embody perfect wisdom. Augus-
tine sometimes uses civ. to present the history of humankind as a mirror in 
which leaders can see the reflection of their own motives and the effects of 
their actions. The struggle between greed and generosity, sincerity and op-
portunism, dominates both history and the struggle that leaders must wage 
within themselves before they speak, decide, and act. The dramatic conflict on 
earth between these two cities, Jerusalem and Babylon, has no end: the two 
cities are intertwined in this world, just as they are intertwined in the hearts 
of politicians and of other mortals. 
The Intertwining of Church and State in the Person 
of the Bishop as a Mediator and Judge
As has been seen, bishops were given the authority by the State to adjudicate 
legal disputes and to reconcile quarrelling parties. This explains why Augustine 
spent a great deal of his time hearing litigants, passing sentence, and making 
peace between them. His biographer Possidius mentions that Augustine spent 
whole days dispensing justice in his  curia episcopalis. In the secretarium of 
his cathedral church, Augustine issued rulings every morning in suits relating 
to the law of property, inheritance, or contracts. He also presided over cases 
concerning the legal status of slavery, the right of asylum, and adultery. It is 
no surprise that his treatise on adulterous marriages (De adulterinis coniugiis) 
is written in a legal style. Contested wills were frequently placed before him 
9 See Cranz, passim. 
10 See, for example, ord. 2, 5, 17; 2, 6, 18.
11 See also ep. gal. 20: “Conturbatio enim ordini contraria est, ordo est autem a carnalibus ad 
spiritalia surgere, non ab spiritalibus ad carnalia cadere, sicut istis acciderat”; and Gen. adu. 
Man., 2, 9,12 “arrogando.”
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for adjudication. The prestige of his position also ensured that many requests 
were put to him, requests he always took seriously and which he sometimes 
pursued with local rulers or imperial authorities. From time to time he under-
took tiring journeys to be able to mediate in person. He even opened a legal 
advice centre to facilitate this juridical aspect of his activities, and he regularly 
consulted competent lawyers, such as his friend and colleague Bishop Alypius, 
who had excellent contacts at the imperial court. 
As in the case of rulers who have the authority to implement coercive mea-
sures, Augustine argued that judges must be able to judge their own deeds and 
motives within themselves: “Esto iudex in te!” In his analysis, the real weakness 
of the legal system is not systemic but results from human frailty. His view 
of justice was based more on his analysis of the capacities, limitations, and 
imperfections of man than on his thinking on social and political structures 
(Dodaro 99-115). He also confronted the rulers and judges with the basic rule 
not to do anything in legislation or in the administration of justice that they 
would not want done to themselves. In order to distinguish justice from injus-
tice, it is of course necessary to be competent, erudite, effective, and faithful 
to the legal precepts. But Augustine hastened to add that judges must person-
ally experience in their imagination the sentence they pass by  emphatically 
placing themselves in the shoes of the person they are sentencing. They will 
not have heard the case properly until they have themselves imagined the tor-
ments of the anxiety that the accused person is  experiencing. 
In ep. 133, which he wrote around 411 and was addressed to the imperial com-
missary Marcellinus, Augustine asked him why criminal justice was not ap-
plied to Donatists who had committed offences against Catholic priests. He 
maintained two principles in doing so.
The legal procedure stipulated that officers of the civil or ecclesiastical courts—
i.e. judges or bishops—were bound to observe that judges must interrogate 
rather than inculpate. This is also what Augustine did himself. Comparing the 
judge’s actions to  those of a doctor, he told Marcellinus that the interrogation 
should be  sharp and painful. It was part of his strategy to interrogate in great 
detail and very precisely. The accused was thus subjected to an inquisitorial 
trial, which was intended to foster in him a clear and unrestrained sense of his 
own badness. But this was not a goal in itself. Precisely because the interro-
gation was followed by a mild punishment, the realisation on the part of the 
accused ultimately served the intensification of a kind of gratitude at being 
let off lightly. Augustine’s main interest in determining the penalty was not, 
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 therefore, to apply the law;12 his sentences were intended to occasion a pro-
cess of seeking of the truth in the accused person’s heart. 
The torment of the interrogation was not a goal in itself, no more than the 
pain that the doctor inflicts or the violence that the State  exercises are goals 
in themselves. Ultimately, the accused must become  aware of the paterna dil-
igentia, which Augustine was keen to reflect in his  dealings with the accused. 
It was the responsibility of bishops who  acted as  judges to practice evangeli-
cal clemency (mansuetudo). Whereas the punishments imposed by the secular 
magistrates were meant to be  deterrents, Augustine endeavoured to ensure—in 
line with his  pedagogical “system”—that his punishments would produce new 
insight and inner reform.
Peace at Every Level of Human Existence
In the so-called “table of peace” in the nineteenth book of civ., written around 
425, Augustine discusses the aspects of human existence that are crucial to 
the realisation of peace on Earth. He returned there to a train of thought that 
he had first expressed in 388. In De quantitate animae, he described for the 
first time the seven aspects of human beings in their mutual interdependence. 
The level of vegetative life (breathing, 1) is followed by the sensory life (feel-
ing, smell, sight, hearing, taste, 2), the intellectual life (thinking, manual and 
artistic skill, 3) and ultimately by the level of the moral life (4). This consists of 
obedience to precepts which, if practiced, ensures a balance in the soul (pul-
chre ad pulchrum), which then loses itself in God’s life (pulchre in pulchro, 5), 
is absorbed in God (pulchre ad Pulchritudinem, 6) and becomes one with God 
(pulchre apud Pulchritudinem, 7).
This line of reasoning, which dates from the year 388, one year after Augus-
tine’s baptism, was no longer entirely neo-Platonic. Although Augustine de-
scribed the elevation, the rise of human beings in a neoplatonic way, he clearly 
12 See ep. 133, 2: “Imple, christiane iudex, pii patris officium; sic succense iniquitati, ut con-
sulere humanitati memineris: nec in peccatorum atrocitatibus exerceas ulciscendi libidinem; 
sed peccatorum vulneribus curandi adhibeas voluntatem. Noli perdere paternam diligentiam, 
quam in ipsa inquisitione servasti, quando tantorum scelerum confessionem, non extendente 
equuleo, non sulcantibus ungulis, non urentibus flammis, sed virgarum verberibus eruisti. 
Qui modus coercitionis a magistris artium liberalium, et ab ipsis parentibus, et saepe etiam 
in iudiciis solet ab episcopis adhiberi. Noli ergo atrocius vindicare, quod lenius invenisti. In-
quirendi quam puniendi necessitas maior est: ad hoc enim et mitissimi homines facinus oc-
cultatum diligenter atque instanter examinant, ut inveniant quibus parcant. Unde plerumque 
necesse est, exerceatur acrius inquisitio, ut manifestato scelere sit ubi appareat mansuetudo.”
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already believed that all aspects of human existence are important in this rise 
or elevation to the highest being. The human is involved in this as a spiritual 
and physical being—in contrast to Plato; therefore, the physical does not need 
to be “eliminated.” Nearly thirty years later, Augustine still espoused this an-
thropology. It formed the basis for his table of peace. He wrote: 
The peace of the body is, then, the properly ordered arrangement of its parts; 
the peace of the irrational soul is the properly ordered satisfaction of the appe-
tites; the peace of the rational soul is the properly ordered accord of cognition 
and action; the peace of the body and soul together is the properly ordered 
life and well being of a living creature; peace between mortal man and God is 
properly ordered obedience, in faith, under eternal law; peace among men is 
the properly ordered concord of mind with mind; the peace of a household 
is the properly ordered concord, with respect to command and obedience, 
of those who are living together; the peace of a city is the properly ordered 
concord, with respect to command and obedience, of its citizens; the peace 
of the heavenly city is perfectly ordered and wholly concordant  fellowship in 
the enjoyment of God and of each other in God. The  peace of all things is the 
tranquility of order, and order is the arrangement of things equal and unequal 
that assigns to each its due place (civ., 19, 13) (trans. Babcock 368).13
Augustine assumes here that humans are composites of body and soul. Within 
the soul, the vital, non-rational part must be distinguished from the rational 
soul. Peace must reign in each of these three dimensions. The peace of the 
body is attained through “the properly ordered arrangement of its parts”; the 
peace of the vital, but non-rational part of the soul through the ‘the properly 
ordered satisfaction of the appetites’ (civ., 19, 13).14 If all organs and body parts 
function in accordance with the order of creation, and if the human is there-
fore free of any disordered tendencies, Augustine speaks of ordered life that 
causes well-being.15 Peace within the rational soul in turn presupposes order 
in the body and the mind. But peace within the rational soul is primarily the 
fruit of the “the properly ordered accord of cognition and action” (civ., 9.13).16 
13 See Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum.
14 “Pax itaque corporis est ordinata temperatura partium, pax animae inrationalis ordinata 
requies appetitionum.”
15 See civ. 19, 14: “Utrumque autem simul ei paci prodest, quam inter se habent anima et cor-
pus, id est ordinatae vitae ac salutis.” See also 19,13: «Pax corporis et animae ordinata vita et 
salus animantis, pax hominis mortalis et Dei ordinata in fide sub aeterna lege oboedientia.”
16 “Pax animae rationalis ordinata cognitionis actionisque consensio.”
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As in De quantitate animae and the Praeceptum, Augustine postulates in the table 
of peace that physical health is the basis for spiritual  well-being. Physical health 
is therefore of the utmost importance for the spiritual life. He writes in s. 277:
Look, my dearest friends; when this body of ours is healthy, even this fragile 
and mortal object, when it is regulated by the constitution of its parts, when 
there is nothing in it quarreling with anything else, not heat overcoming and 
driving out coolness, not warmth being extinguished by an excess of cold—and 
afflicting the body while the fight’s going on; not dryness absorbing the mois-
ture, not the moist overflowing and congesting; but all things it consists of are 
balanced with each other in a harmonious relationship, which is called health. 
In a word, the health of the body is the harmony of those things of which it 
consists (trans. Hill 35).
In the table of peace, Augustine also associates physical health with the in-
stincts, unconscious motives and impulses that also cause human actions, 
but that cannot be derived exclusively from rational considerations. He thinks 
these are produced by the non-rational part of the soul, the part of the soul 
that humans have in common with animals. The Church father suggests here 
that people who do not experience peace within themselves are oblivious to 
irrational processes that take place within the non-rational part of the soul. 
But he does not subscribe to the Stoic view that all perturbationes must be 
eradicated before reason can rule. As has been seen, he does not think that 
victory over pathè, apatheia, is a normal condition, because it is wrong to be-
lieve that the wise man should have no compassion as compassion involves 
suffering (s., 348, 2).17 He would write therefore in civ. that the affects cannot 
be eliminated but must be governed by the will. If the will is good, then fear 
will be good too (Fiedrowicz 431-440).
As has been seen, Augustine then assumes in the table of  peace that peace is 
established in man’s highest dimension of being, the rational soul (the only 
dimension that humans do not have in  common with animals), through the 
harmony of thought and action. It is clear that personal integrity is a form 
of peace, founded on physical and spiritual balance: on health, insight into, 
and a certain level of control over the “animal spirits” within the “I.”18 This 
17 See mor. 27, 53-54 (compassion with those in need must not perturb one’s own soul too 
much, but nor must apatheia cause inhumane behaviour). See also, for the influence of the 
notion of apatheia on Christianity, Mühlenberg 000.
18 See, for the latter point, Akerlof and Shiller. They deplore the fact that almost all of the ani-
mal spirits that Keynes identified in The General Theory as the cause of the Great  Depression 
have been pushed to the margins by later economists. 
Magnum Beneficium est Pax, sed Dei Veri Beneficium est (civ., 3.9) [209]
peace within the rational part of the soul is then immediately placed with-
in the perspective of peace between mortal man and God, a peace that en-
compasses “properly ordered obedience, in faith, under eternal law” (civ., 19, 
13). If someone has attained physical and spiritual balance, and his thoughts 
and actions are consistent, then, Augustine believes, this results in the con-
sciousness of  being part of an order of creation which is oriented to  peace. 
This is not very different from the notion of oikeiosis. In this context Augus-
tine then describes peace between people as their ordered harmony. In the 
table of peace, just as in the Praeceptum, personal integrity is also related 
to the way one treats others, in chance encounters or in more structured 
 forms of communal living such as the home, the city or the world. The dis-
course on peace within man is therefore followed directly by a description 
of peace within the home and in the city as the “ordered harmony” in which 
“with respect to command and obedience” (civ., 19, 13).19 Domestic peace, 
where paternal authority is characterised by caring compassion, just like that 
of the praepositus, is oriented to civic peace.20 This ordinata concordia lies at 
the basis of every people, defined by Augustine as “an assembled multitude—
not of animals but of rational creatures—, and is joined together by the com-
mon agreement on the objects of its love” (civ., 19, 6).21 This was a common-
place in Antiquity. Ideally, the family, the home, stood at the service of the 
city, just as the city was the foundation of the  empire. At the same time, he 
 emphasizes the social nature of the human race and the value of natural bonds 
and friendship (bono coniug., 1, 1). Anyone who is born, is born to become a 
friend. 
In the table of peace, social order is the result of the order and balance that 
individuals are able to realise within themselves. The individual’s highest task 
is to become a person of integrity. This integrity is  assumed and developed 
in his or her interactions with others. But Augustine  contends emphatically 
that integrity in this sense must be supported by the ordering of irrational 
dimensions and of the physical dimension. Integrity thus presupposes integri-
tas, wholeness, and also contributes to this.
19 See civ., 19, 13: “Pax hominum ordinata concordia, pax domus ordinata imperandi  atque 
oboediendi concordia cohabitantium, pax civitatis ordinata imperandi atque oboediendi 
concordia civium, pax caelestis civitatis ordinatissima et concordissima societas fruendi et 
invicem in Deo, pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis” (trans. Babcock 385).
20 See Schrama “Augustinus” 133-148; and “Praeposito” 847-878.
21 “Coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus.” See 
19, 17.
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In this way, Augustine brings physical harmony, irrational and rational motives, 
the pursuit of integrity, the role of the family and of the government into a single 
vision, articulated in his so-called “table of peace” in fewer than twenty lines. It is 
a map showing the reader precisely what factors are required for individual and 
social peace and how these two things are interrelated. Peace within an individ-
ual person is interrelated with the harmony that is pursued on various levels of 
society. In the different social units, the individual must, on the one hand, have 
the scope to discover what rational and irrational forces move him. On the 
other hand, relatives or members of wider social units set boundaries that 
prevent the individual from being destroyed by his animal spirits, his jealousy, 
resentment, and illusions. The table of peace shows that Augustine believes 
personal integrity is founded upon physical and spiritual calm and equilibrium. 
But in order to be able to stimulate integrity as the bridge between individual 
peace and peace in society, he  demands the same from society at all levels. Au-
gustine regards the  social connections within society as instances that, each 
at their own level, create preconditions for the cultivation of personal integrity 
as a source of peace at the highest level of humankind, with all the beneficial 
effects that this has on society. 
Conclusion: The Usefulness of Idleness
It has yet to be investigated whether the bishops’ success in the fourth and 
fifth centuries was due to the sense of reality that Augustine expresses in his 
reflections on the business of politics and the inner life of politicians. But it 
is a paradox that their power in the Roman Empire should have increased at 
the time that Augustine was proclaiming frankly that political leaders cannot 
bring perfect happiness, and cannot do much more, in fact, than create the 
conditions to avoid chaos in the world, as well as that political institutions are 
essentially tragic due to their impermanence and transience. 
Augustine has no ready-made solutions to offer on the utility of Christianity 
for Christian Democracy, because he lived and worked under different social 
circumstances. Yet his gradually acquired insight that people do not act quite 
as rationally in the public domain as they think they do, is as timeless as it is 
realistic. The attention he pays to the  limitations of human beings is also valu-
able; it is even the prelude to his uncoupling of religion and politics, which is 
effected in order to avoid investing politicians with sacral power, thus obscur-
ing their shortcomings. 
Magnum Beneficium est Pax, sed Dei Veri Beneficium est (civ., 3.9) [211]
Augustine describes three ways of living in civ. The first is a life without re-
sponsibilities, spent searching for truth about the world and about oneself; the 
second is an active life, spent taking care of human affairs. The third is a har-
monious combination of the two former styles (civ., 19, 2). There is no doubt 
that he believed the third way of life to be most appropriate for the politician, 
no matter in what era or under what political system.
The torment of the probing interrogation was not a goal in itself; the accused 
had to become aware of the paterna diligentia and the mansuetudo of the 
judge (the bishop) in his dealings with the accused. According to Augustine’s 
own pedagogical “system”, only then his punishments would bring about new 
insight and inner reform.
Augustine was demanding of those who fulfil responsible political functions. 
As a former professor of rhetoric he knew that those in public  office gain in 
authority if it is clear to everyone that they pursue the same ideals in both the 
personal and the public domain. Clerics in  particular are expected to make 
choices in their daily lives that are in accordance with their state of life or the 
position they occupy. At the end of his life, Augustine described in De civitate 
Dei, in less than twenty lines, the interrelatedness between physicality, irra-
tional and rational motives, the pursuit of integrity, the role of the family and 
of  government. In his  so- called “table of peace”, he charted the factors that 
come into play whenever people seek peace both within themselves and in the 
world. Augustine presupposed that there is interaction between  tendencies 
that emerge from the body, from the instinctive,  moral, and social life. In his 
view, animal spirits, one’s own irrationality and subconscious  motives, are not 
just possible causes of personal, but also of economic or social instability. He 
thought that integrity rests upon a balance in the personal life. Body and mind 
must work together.  Equilibrium in the mind presupposes equilibrium in the 
body. Both form the basis for personal integrity, the virtue which Augustine 
believed is itself the foundation of peace in any form of community. It tran-
spires therefore that Augustine’s thinking on the order of the world and the 
quality of human society at all levels is infused with a sense that integrity, in 
our sense of the word, is a crucial virtue. 
The phenomenon of man always remained a riddle to Augustine. In the 
Confessiones, at the end of his descent into memory and the subconscious, 
he expressed this very strikingly in his famous phrase “Mihi quaestio factus 
sum” (“I have become a question to myself”) (conf., 10, 33, 50). Living both in 
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a  complex society and in an incomprehensible creation, people, Augustine 
thought, are faced with the tremendous challenge to seek the truth and to 
find the Truth. But perhaps more than any Church father before him, he was 
strongly aware of the fact that no one can even approximate the truth about 
themselves or the Truth behind all things if they do not live a truthful life. 
Magnum Beneficium est Pax, sed Dei Veri Beneficium est (civ., 3.9) [213]
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